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AN AUTHENTICATION SCHEME FOR SUBSPACE CODES OVER
NETWORK BASED ON LINEAR CODES
JUN ZHANG, XINRAN LI AND FANG-WEI FU
Abstract. Network coding provides the advantage of maximizing the usage of network
resources, and has great application prospects in future network communications. How-
ever, the properties of network coding also make the pollution attack more serious. In this
paper, we give an unconditional secure authentication scheme for network coding based on
a linear code C. Safavi-Naini and Wang [1] gave an authentication code for multi-receivers
and multiple messages. We notice that the scheme of Safavi-Naini and Wang is essentially
constructed with Reed-Solomon codes. And we modify their construction slightly to make
it serve for authenticating subspace codes over linear network. Also, we generalize the
construction with linear codes. The generalization to linear codes has the similar advan-
tages as generalizing Shamir’s secret sharing scheme to linear secret sharing sceme based
on linear codes [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. One advantage of this generalization is that for a fixed mes-
sage space, our scheme allows arbitrarily many receivers to check the integrity of their own
messages, while the scheme with Reed-Solomon codes has a constraint on the number of
verifying receivers. Another advantage is that we introduce access structure in the general-
ized scheme. Massey [4] characterized the access structure of linear secret sharing scheme
by minimal codewords in the dual code whose first component is 1. We slightly modify the
definition of minimal codewords in [4]. Let C be a [V, k] linear code. For any coordinate
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,V}, a codeword ~c in C is called minimal respect to i if the codeword ~c has
component 1 at the i-th coordinate and there is no other codeword whose i-th component
is 1 with support strictly contained in that of ~c. Then the security of receiver Ri in our
authentication scheme is characterized by the minimal codewords respect to i in the dual
code C⊥ .
Authentication scheme, network coding, subspace codes, linear codes, minimal code-
words, substitution attack.
1. Introduction
1.1. Background. Network coding is a novel technique to achieve the maximum multi-
cast throughput, which was introduced by Ahlswede et al. [7]. It allows the intermediate
node to generate output data by mixing its received data. In 2003, Li et al. [8] further
showed that linear network coding is sufficient to achieve the optimal throughput in multi-
cast networks. Subsequently, Ho et al. [9] introduced the concept of random linear network
coding, and proved that it achieves the maximum throughput of multicast network with
high probability. Network coding is efficiently applicable to numerous forms of network
communications, such as Internet TV, wireless networks, content distribution networks and
P2P networks. Due to these advantages, network coding attracts many researchers and has
developed very quickly.
This research is supported by the National Key Basic Research Program of China (Grant No.
2013CB834204), and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61171082, 10990011 and
60872025). The author Jun Zhang is also supproted by the Chinese Scholarship Council under the State Scholar-
ship Fund during visiting University of California, Irvine.
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However, networks using network coding impose security problems that traditional net-
works do not face. A particularly important problem is the pollution attack. If some nodes
in the network are malicious and inject corrupted packets into the information flow, then
the honest intermediate node mix invalid packet with other packets. According to the rule
of network coding, the corrupted outgoing packets quickly pollute the whole network and
cause all the messages to be decoded wrongly in the destination.
Recently several related works are proposed to address the pollution attack, such as ho-
momorphic hashing, digital signature and message authentication code (MAC). Krohn et
al. [10] (see also [11]) used homomorphic hashing function to prevent pollution attacks.
Yu et al. [12] proposed a homomorphic signature scheme based on discrete logarithm and
RSA, which however was showed insecurely by Yun et al. [13]. Charles et al. [14] gave
a signature scheme based on Weil pairing over elliptic curves and provided authentication
of the data in addition to detecting pollution attacks. Zhao et al. [15] designed a signature
scheme that view all blocks of the file as vectors and make use of the fact that all valid
vectors transmitted in the network should belong to the subspace spanned by the original
set of vectors from the file. Boneh et al. [16] proposed two signature schemes that can be
used in conjunction with network coding to prevent malicious modification of messages,
and they showed that their constructions had a lower signature length compared with re-
lated prior work. Boneh et al. [17] constructed a linearly homomorphic signature scheme
that authenticates vectors with coordinates in the binary field F2. It is the first such scheme
based on the hard problem of finding short vectors in integer lattices. Agrawal and Boneh
[18] designed a homomorphic MAC system that allows checking the integrity of network
coded data. These works provide computational security (i.e., the attacker’s resources are
limited) in network coding.
Besides digital signatures and MACs, authentication codes also satisfy the properties
of authentication. However, authentication code provides unconditional security (i.e., the
attacker has unlimited computational power). In the multi-receiver authentication model,
a sender broadcasts an authenticated message such that all the receivers can independently
verify the authenticity of the message with their own private keys. It requires a security that
malicious groups of up to a given size of receivers can not successfully impersonate the
transmitter, or substitute a transmitted message. Desmedt et al. [19] gave an authentica-
tion scheme of single message for multi-receivers. Safavi-Naini and Wang [1] extended the
DFY scheme [19] to be an authentication scheme of multiple messages for multi-receivers.
Note that their construction was not linear over the base field with respect to the message.
Oggier and Fathi [20, 21] made a little modification of the construction so that the con-
struction can be used for network coding. Tang [22] used homomorphic authentication
codes to sign a subspace which provide an unconditionally security.
In this paper, we consider the combination of authentication code and secret sharing into
multicast network coding. And we use subspace codes to transmit messages. The verifying
nodes independently verify the authenticity of the message using each own private key,
which is distributes by the trusted authority. Our method of authentication for subspace
codes is different from signature through sign a subspace [15, 16]. Also, compared with
the computational security of [15] and [16], our construction is an unconditionally secure
authentication code. And compared with the homomorphic scheme [22], our scheme is not
homomorphic.
Firstly, we recall the general model of network coding and the definition of subspace
codes. In the basic multicast model for linear network coding, a source node s generates
n messages, each consisting of m symbols in the base field Fq. Let {x1, x2, . . . , xn} ⊆
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l×1
q represent the set of messages. Based on the messages, the source node s transmits
a message over each outgoing channel. At a node in the network, the symbols on its
outgoing channel are Fq-linear combinations of incoming symbols. For a node i, define
Out(i) = {e ∈ E : e is an outgoing channel of i}, and In(i) = {e ∈ E : e is an incoming
channel of i}. If the channel e of network carries packet y(e), where e ∈ Out(i), and i is
an internal nodes, then y(e) satisfies y(e) = ∑d∈in(i) kdey(d). The |In(i)| × |Out(i)| matrix
Ki = [kde]d∈in(i),e∈Out(i) is called the local encoding kernel at node i. Note that each y(e)
is a linear combination of the messages sent by the source node, so there exists a vector
fe ∈ F1×nq such that
y(e) = feX, where X =

x1
x2
...
xn

.
The vector fe is called the global encoding vector of channel e. Given the local encod-
ing kernels for all the channels in network, the global encoding kernels can be calculated
recursively in any upstream-to-downstream order as follows
fe =
∑
d∈in(i)
kde fd .
Write the received vectors at a node t as a column vector
At = (y(e) : e ∈ In(t))T =

y(e1)
y(e2)
...
y(ee(t))

,
where In(t) = {e1, e2, · · · , ee(t)}. Then we have the decoding equation at the node t
Ft · X = At ,
where
Ft = ( fe : e ∈ In(t))T =

fe1
fe2
...
fee(t)

is called the global encoding kernel at the node t.
The set of all subspaces of an l-dimensional vector space Flq forms a projective space
Pq(l). The set of all n-dimensional subspaces of an l-dimensional vector space is called
a Grassmannian manifold Gq(l, n). A subspace code [23] C ⊂ Pq(l) is a collection of
subspaces in Pq(l) (for details about subspace codes, one can see [23]). Moreover, if
C ⊂ Gq(l, n) then C is a constant-dimension code of dimension n [23, 24]. For subspace
codes, the problem is formulated as transmission of subspaces through a linear network.
Suppose the network has minimum cut n. Then the transmitter selects a vector space V ∈ C
from some constant dimension code C ⊂ Gq(l, n), and sends a basis of V into the network.
The receiver t gathers packets he received, and spans them to form a vector space U. Then
he regards the subspace U as his received message. It is easy to see that if all channels in
the network are error-free, then the node t can decode the original message V , i.e., U = V if
and only if the global encoding kernel at the node t is of full rank n (also see [23, Corollary
3]).
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Because the secret key sharing process in our authentication scheme is similar as that
in the linear secret sharing scheme, we recall some basic concepts of linear codes and the
traditional linear secret sharing scheme. Let FVq be the V-dimensional vector space over
the finite field Fq with q elements. For any vector ~x = (x1, x2, · · · , xV ) ∈ FVq , the Hamming
weight Wt(~x) of ~x is defined to be the number of non-zero coordinates, i.e.,
Wt(~x) = # {i | 1 6 i 6 V, xi , 0} .
A linear [V, k] code C is a k-dimensional linear subspace of FVq . The minimum distance
d(C) of C is the minimum Hamming weight of all non-zero vectors in C, i.e.,
d(C) = min{Wt(~c) |~c ∈ C \ {~0}} .
A linear [V, k] code C ⊆ FVq is called a [V, k, d] linear code if C has minimum distance d. A
vector in C is called a codeword of C. A matrix G ∈ Fk×Vq is call a generator matrix of C
if rows of G form a basis for C. A well known trade-off between the parameters of a linear
[V, k, d] code is the Singleton bound which states that
d 6 V − k + 1 .
A [V, k, d] code is called a maximum distance separable (MDS) code if d = V − k + 1. The
dual code C⊥ of C is defined as the set{
~x ∈ FVq | ~x · ~c = 0 for all ~c ∈ C
}
,
where ~x · ~c is the inner product of vectors ~x and ~c, i.e.,
~x · ~c = x1c1 + x2c2 + · · · + xVcV .
The secret sharing scheme provides security of a secret key by “splitting” it to several
parts which are kept by different persons. In this way, it might need many persons to
recover the original key. It can achieve to resist the attack of malicious groups of persons.
Shamir [2] used polynomials over finite fields to give an (S , T ) threshold secret sharing
scheme such that any T persons of the S shares can uniquely determine the secret key
but any T − 1 persons can not get any information of the key. A linear secret sharing
scheme based on a linear code [4] is constructed as follows: encrypt the secret to be the
first coordinate of a codeword and distribute the rest of the codeword (except the first secret
coordinate) to the group of shares. McEliece and Sarwate [3] pointed out that the Shamir’s
construction is essentially a linear secret sharing scheme based on Reed-Solomon codes.
Also as a natural generalization of Shamir’construction, Chen and Cramer [6] constructed
a linear secret sharing scheme based on algebraic geometric codes.
The qualified subset of a linear secret sharing scheme is a subset of shares such that
the shares in the subset can recover the secret key. A qualified subset is call minimal if
any share is removed from the qualified subset, the rests cannot recover the secret key.
The access structure of a linear secret sharing scheme consists of all the minimal qualified
subsets. A codeword ~v in a linear code C is said to be minimal if ~v is a non-zero codeword
whose leftmost nonzero component is a 1 and no other codeword~v′ whose leftmost nonzero
component is 1 has support strictly contained in the support of ~v. Massey [4, 5] showed that
the access structure of a linear secret sharing scheme based on a linear code are completely
determined by the minimal codewords in the dual code whose first component is 1.
Proposition 1 ([4]). The access structure of the linear secret-sharing scheme correspond-
ing to the linear code C is specified by those minimal codewords in the dual code C⊥ whose
first component is 1. In the manner that the set of shares specified by a minimal codeword
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whose first component is 1 in the dual code is the set of shares corresponding to those
locations after the first in the support of this minimal codeword.
With the above preparation, we next present our construction and main results.
1.2. Our Construction and Main Results. Suppose the base field of the network is the
finite field Fq and we use subspace codes to transmit messages. Take the message space to
be the Grassmannian manifold Gq(l, n). The source wants to send a message U ∈ Gq(l, n),
he could send any basis ~s1, ~s2, · · · , ~sn for U. After network coding, any node in the network
linearly combines the vectors he received to obtain a linear subspace of Flq. Provided that no
error occurs in the network, then the linear subspace is just the message sent by the source if
the dimension of the subspace equals n. We authenticate the basis ~s1, ~s2, · · · , ~sn. Instead of
sending the original base directly, the source node actually sends the authenticated vectors.
And each node in the network receives linear combinations of the tagged vectors. Some
nodes R1,R2, · · · ,RV in the network can also use their own protocols to verify the integrity
of the received vectors. We call these nodes verifying nodes.
There may be some malicious receivers in the network who collude to perform an im-
personation attack by constructing a fake message, or a substitution attack by altering the
message content such that the new tagged message can be accepted by some other receiver
or specific receiver. To substitute the message, the malicious group should generate a vec-
tor not in the subspace sent by the source such that the vector with a tag can be accepted
by some other receiver.
In this subsection, we present our construction of an authentication scheme based on a
linear code for subspace codes in network coding. It will be shown that the ability of our
scheme to resist the attack of the malicious receivers is measured by the minimum distance
of the dual code and minimal codewords respect to specific coordinate in the dual code.
Construction:
Let C ⊆ FVql be a linear code with minimum distance d(C) > 2. And assume that the
minimum distance of the dual C⊥ is d(C⊥) > 2. Fix a generator matrix G of C
G =

g1,1 g1,2 · · · g1,V
g2,1 g2,2 · · · g2,V
...
...
. . .
...
gk,1 gk,2 · · · gk,V

.
Then make G public.
• Key generation: A trusted authority randomly chooses parameters
A =

a0,1 a0,2 · · · a0,k
a1,1 a1,2 · · · a1,k
...
...
. . .
...
aM,1 aM,2 · · · aM,k

∈ F
(M+1)×k
ql .
• Key distribution: The trusted authority computes
B = A ·G =

b0,1 b0,2 · · · b0,V
b1,1 b1,2 · · · b1,V
...
...
. . .
...
bM,1 bM,2 · · · bM,V

.
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Then the trusted authority distributes each verifier Ri the i-th column of B as the
private key, for i = 1, 2, · · · ,V .
• Authentication tag: Assume that the source node sends a basis ~s1, ~s2, · · · , ~sn ∈ U
of a n-dimensional subspace U of Flq. The trusted authority chooses an Fq-linear
isomorphism between Flq and Fql . Without any confusion, we identify Flq with
Fql via this isomorphism (this isomorphism is also made public). Then define
multiplication in Flq via the multiplication in Fql . The source computes the tag
map
L = [L1, L2, · · · , Lk] : Flq → Fklq
~s 7→ [L1(~s), L2(~s), · · · , Lk(~s)] ,
where the map Li (i = 1, 2, · · · , k) is defined by1
Li(~s) = a0,i +
M∑
j=1
a j,i~sq
j−1 for any ~s ∈ Flq .
For each i = 1, 2, · · · , n, instead of ~si, the source node actually sends packets ~xi of
the form
~xi = [1, ~si, L(~si)] ∈ F1+l+klq .
Remark 1. Add “1” at the beginning of each tagged vectors, then this scheme can be used
to random network coding for keeping the track of the network coding coefficients. In this
way, the internal verifying nodes could not know the exact global encoding kernel, but also
can do verification of the received vectors. We will see this in the verification step. For
network coding with fixed local encoding kernel, we can delete the first bit 1, and define
the tag map Li to be linear with respect to vector ~s,
∑M
j=0 a j,i~s
q j
.
Verification:
Suppose the global encoding kernel at the verifying node Ri is
Hi =

h(i)1,1 h
(i)
1,2 · · · h
(i)
1,n
h(i)2,1 h
(i)
2,2 · · · h
(i)
2,n
...
...
. . .
...
h(i)
e(i),1 h
(i)
e(i),2 · · · h
(i)
e(i),n

.
Then the node Ri receives the tagged vector
~y(Ri) = Hi

~x1
~x2
...
~xn

.
The m-th row is given by
n∑
j=1
h(i)
m, j,
n∑
j=1
h(i)
m, j~s j,
n∑
j=1
h(i)
m, jL1(~s j), · · · ,
n∑
j=1
h(i)
m, jLk(~s j)
 .
1Note that any Fq-linear endomorphism f of Fql is of the form f (~x) =
∑l
j=1 ai~x
q j−1 (for any ~x ∈ Fql ) for some
ai ∈ Fq, i = 1, 2, · · · , l. To fit the linear operation of the network coding, the tag map should be Fq-linear or “near”
Fq–linear on ~s.
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The verifier Ri checks that whether
n∑
j=1
h(i)
m, j
 b0,i +
M∑
t=1

n∑
j=1
h(i)
m, j~s j

qt−1
bt,i
equals to
k∑
t=1

n∑
j=1
h(i)
m, jLt(~s j)
 gt,i ,
for all m = 1, 2, · · · , e(i).
We call the result (∑nj=1 h(i)m, j)b0,i +
∑M
t=1 ~s
qt−1 bt,i ∈ Fql the label of Ri for ~s ∈ Fql .
Correctness of Verification: if the network has not been invaded, the node Ri should have∑k
t=1
(∑n
j=1 h
(i)
m, jLt(~s j)
)
gt,i
=
∑k
t=1
(∑n
j=1 h
(i)
m, j(a0,t +
∑M
r=1 ar,t~s
qr−1
j )
)
gt,i
=
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
m, j(
∑k
t=1 a0,tgt,i) +
∑M
r=1(
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
m, j~s
qr−1
j )(
∑k
t=1 ar,tgt,i)
= (∑nj=1 h(i)m, j)b0,i +
∑M
r=1
(∑n
j=1 h
(i)
m, j~s j
)qr−1
br,i .
for all m = 1, 2, · · · , e(i).
We summarize the extra costs in general when we communicate messages with the
authentication tag:
Tag size kl + 1/Fq
Communication cost kl + 1/Fq
Tag computation cost (M − 1)kn exp. /Fql
Mkn multi. /Fql
Verification computation cost at Ri (M − 1)e(i) exp. /Fql
(M + k + 1)e(i) multi. /Fql
Storage at the source (M + 1)k/Fql
Storage at each verifier M + 1/Fql
Key distribution computation cost (M + 1)kV multi. /Fql
Where 1/Fq, 1exp./Fq and 1multi./Fq mean one symbol, one exponent operation and
one multiplication operation in the finite field Fq, respectively. When we use special gener-
ator matrix, e.g., the generator matrix of a systematic code, the cost at the verifying nodes
will be less. Note that the disadvantage is that the tag part introduces much redundancy
comparing with the length of original vector.
The Main Results about the Security of Our Scheme:
The security of the above authentication scheme is summarized in the following theorems.
Theorem 2. The scheme we constructed above is an unconditionally secure authentication
code for network coding against a coalition of up to (d(C⊥) − 2) malicious receivers.
The proof of this theorem will be given in Section 2.
More specifically, if we consider what a coalition of malicious receivers can success-
fully make a substitution attack to one fixed receiver Ri. To characterize this malicious
group, we slightly modify the definition of minimal codeword in [4].
Definition 1. Let C be a [N, k] linear code. For any i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, a codeword ~c in C is
called minimal respect to i if the codeword ~c has component 1 at the i-th location and there
is no other codeword whose i-th component is 1 with support strictly contained in that of
~c.
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Similarly as Proposition 1, we have
Theorem 3. For the authentication scheme we constructed, we have
(i): The set of all minimal malicious groups that can successfully make a substitution
attack2 to the receiver Ri is determined completely by all the minimal codewords
respect to i in the dual code C⊥.
(ii): All malicious groups that can not produce a fake authenticated message which
can be accepted by the receiver Ri are one-to-one corresponding to subsets of
[V] \ {i} such that each of them together with i does not contain any support of
minimal codeword respect to i in the dual code C⊥, where [V] = {1, 2, · · · ,V}.
If we take MDS codes, e.g., Reed-Solomon codes, in our construction, Theorems 2
and 3 induces the following corollary.
Corollary 4. Let C be a [V, k, d] MDS code. For our authentication scheme based on C,
we have
(i): The scheme is an unconditionally secure authentication code for network coding
against a coalition of up to (k − 1) malicious receivers.
(ii): Moreover, a malicious group can successfully make a substitution attack to any
other receiver if and only if the malicious group has at least k members.
If an authentication scheme satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) in Corollary 4, then we call
the authentication scheme a (V, k) threshold authentication scheme. In general, it is NP-
hard to determine completely that a malicious group can successfully make a substitution
attack to others or not. More authentication schemes based on algebraic geometry codes
from elliptic curves will be given in Section 3. And we use the group of rational points on
the elliptic curve to give a complete classification as Corollary 4.
In Section 2, we explicitly give the security analysis of our authentication scheme, i.e.,
the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3. In Section 3, we give an explicit authentication scheme
based on algebraic geometry codes from elliptic curves.
2. Security Analysis
In this section, we present the security analysis of our scheme. From the verification
step, we notice that the tagged vector [a, ~s,~v1,~v2, · · · ,~vk] of one incoming edge can be ac-
cepted by the receiver Ri, where a ∈ Fq is the corresponding track of the network coding
coefficients, if and only if ab0,i +
∑M
t=1 ~s
qt−1 bt,i =
∑k
j=1~v jg j,i. So in order to make a substi-
tution attack to Ri, it suffices to know the label ab0,i +
∑M
t=1 ~s
qt−1 bt,i for some ~s ∈ Flq not in
the subspace sent by the transmitter, then it is trivial to construct a tag (~v1,~v2, · · · ,~vk) such
that ab0,i +
∑M
t=1 ~s
qt−1 bt,i =
∑k
j=1~v jg j,i.
The security depends on the hardness to determine the key matrix A or to determine the
private key of some other node by solving a system of linear equations. Suppose a group
of K malicious nodes collaborate to recover A and make a substitution attack. Without loss
of generality, we assume that the malicious nodes are R1,R2, · · · ,RK . Each Ri has some
2Here, we CLARIFY that in the whole paper, “can (successfully) make a substitution attack” means that they
can make a substitution attack deterministically, and “can not” means that they can not successfully produce a
fake authenticated message which can be accepted by others in a probability higher than randomly choosing one.
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information about the key A:

∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, j~s j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, j~s
q
j · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, j~s
qM−1
j∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, j~s j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, j~s
q
j · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, j~s
qM−1
j
...
...
...
. . .
...∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), j~s j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), j~s
q
j · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), j~s
qM−1
j

· A
=

∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, jL1(~s j)
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, jL2(~s j) · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, jLk(~s j)∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, jL1(~s j)
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, jL2(~s j) · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, jLk(~s j)
...
...
. . .
...∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), jL1(~s j)
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), jL2(~s j) · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), jLk(~s j)

and
A ·

g1,i
g2,i
...
gk,i

=

b0,i
b1,i
...
bM,i

.
The group of malicious nodes combines their equations, and they get a system of linear
equations
(2.1)


D1
...
DK
 · A =

C1
...
CK
 ,
A ·

g1,1 g1,2 · · · g1,K
g2,1 g2,2 · · · g2,K
...
...
. . .
...
gk,1 gk,2 · · · gk,K

=

b0,1 b0,2 · · · b0,K
b1,1 b1,2 · · · b1,K
...
...
. . .
...
bM,1 bM,2 · · · bM,K

,
where
Di =

∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, j~s j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, j~s
q
j · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, j~s
qM−1
j∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, j~s j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, j~s
q
j · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, j~s
qM−1
j
...
...
...
. . .
...∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), j~s j
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), j~s
q
j · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), j~s
qM−1
j

and
Ci =

∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, jL1(~s j)
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, jL2(~s j) · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
1, jLk(~s j)∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, jL1(~s j)
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, jL2(~s j) · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
2, jLk(~s j)
...
...
. . .
...∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), jL1(~s j)
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), jL2(~s j) · · ·
∑n
j=1 h
(i)
e(i), jLk(~s j)

.
Denote
S n =

1 ~s1 ~sq1 · · · ~s
qM−1
1
1 ~s2 ~sq2 · · · ~s
qM−1
2
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 ~sn ~sqn · · · ~s
qM−1
n

.
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Then
Di = Hi · S n .
Lemma 5. Let P be the subspace of Fkql generated by {gi1 , gi2 , · · · , giK }, where gi j represents
the i j-th column of the generator matrix G. Suppose K0 = dim P 6 k − 1. Then there exists
exact ql(M+1−r0)(k−K0) matrices A satisfying the system of equations (2.1), where
r0 = rank

Hi1 S n
Hi2 S n
...
HiK S n

.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume {i1, i2, · · · , iK} = {1, 2, · · · , K}. Recall the
system (2.1)


H1S n
...
HKS n
 · A =

C1
...
CK
 ,
A ·

g1,1 g1,2 · · · g1,K
g2,1 g2,2 · · · g2,K
...
...
. . .
...
gk,1 gk,2 · · · gk,K

=

b0,1 b0,2 · · · b0,K
b1,1 b1,2 · · · b1,K
...
...
. . .
...
bM,1 bM,2 · · · bM,K

.
Rewrite the matrix A of variables as a single column of k(M + 1) variables. Then the
system (2.1) becomes
(2.2)

H1S n
H1S n
. . .
H1S n
...
...
. . .
...
HKS n
HKS n
. . .
HKS n
g1,1~IM+1 g2,1~IM+1 · · · gk,1~IM+1
g1,2~IM+1 g2,2~IM+1 · · · gk,2~IM+1
...
...
. . .
...
g1,K~IM+1 g2,K~IM+1 · · · gk,K~IM+1

·

a0,1
a1,1
...
aM,1
a0,2
a1,2
...
aM,2
...
a0,k
a1,k
...
aM,k

= T
where ~IM+1 is the identity matrix with rank (M + 1) and T is the column vector of the
constant terms in system (2.1) with proper order. Notice that
r0 = rank

H1S n
H2S n
...
HKS n

= rank


H1
H2
...
HK

· S n

6 min

rank

H1
H2
...
HK

, n

.
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Also note that rows of 
H1S n
H2S n
...
HKS n

is contained in the space FM+1q generated by gi, j~IM+1 if gi, j , 0. So the rank of the big
matrix of coefficients equals to
r0k + (M + 1 − r0)K0
which is less than the number of variables k(M + 1). So the system (2.2) has
ql(k(M+1)−(r0k+(M+1−r0)K0)) = ql(M+1−r0)(k−K0)
solutions, i.e., the system (2.1) has ql(M+1−r0)(k−K0) solutions. 
Remark 2. From Lemma 5, in order to cut down the extra costs introduced by authenti-
cation, we could choose M = n. In this case, M is the minimal integer such that M > n
and Lemma 5 holds. Lemma 5 is the key lemma in [25] by which we can remove a very
important condition in the main result of [21].
Note that if C [n, k, d = n− k+ 1] is an MDS code, then whenever K 6 k − 1 the vectors
in any K-subset of columns of G are linearly independent.
By Lemma 5, the security of our authentication scheme follows.
Theorem 6. The scheme we constructed above with M = n is an unconditionally secure
authentication code for network coding against a coalition of up to (d(C⊥) − 2) malicious
verifiers.
Proof. Suppose the source node sends M = n Fq-linearly independent vectors ~s1, ~s2, · · · , ~sM,
i.e., a basis for a subspace message. It is enough to consider the case that K = d(C⊥) − 2
malicious nodes have received M Fq-linearly independent vectors ~y1, ~y2, · · · , ~yM and all
these malicious nodes are verifying nodes, this is because in this case they know the most
information about the key matrix A. In other words, the subspace generated by the vec-
tors they received is the subspace sent by the source node. This is also equivalent to the
condition: the coalition of global kernels at each malicious node R1, · · · ,RK has the rank
rank

H1
H2
...
HK

= n .
And under these conditions, they want to make a substitution attack to any other verifying
node.
Suppose the malicious nodes R1, · · · ,RK want to generate a valid M-dimensional sub-
space Fq~s′1 ⊕ Fq~s
′
2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Fq~s
′
M such that it can be accepted by RK+1. It is equivalent to
generating a valid vector [1, ~sM+1,~v1,~v2, · · · ,~vk] with ~sM+1 < Fq~s1 ⊕ Fq~s2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Fq~sM
such that it can be accepted by RK+1. So what they try to do is to guess the label b0,K+1 +
b1,K+1~sM+1 + b2,K+1~sqM+1 + · · · + bM,K+1~s
qM−1
M+1 for some ~sM+1 < Fq~s1 ⊕ Fq~s2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Fq~sM and
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construct a vector3 (~v1,~v2, · · · ,~vk) ∈ Fk×1ql such that
k∑
i=1
gi,K+1~vi = b0,K+1 + b1,K+1~sM+1 + b2,K+1~sqM+1 + · · · + bM,K+1~s
qM−1
M+1 .
Then the fake message [1, ~sM+1,~v1,~v2, · · · ,~vk] can be accepted by RK+1.
In this case, by Lemma 5, there exists ql(k−d(C⊥)+2) matrices A satisfying the system of
equations (2.1).
For any ~sM+1 < Fq~s1 ⊕ Fq~s2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Fq~sM , we define
ϕsM+1 : {Solutions of System (2.1)} −→ Fql
A 7→ (1, ~sM+1, ~sqM+1, · · · , ~sq
M−1
M+1)A

g1,K+1
g2,K+1
...
gk,K+1

.
Then we claim:
(1): ϕ~sM+1 is surjective.
(2): for any y ∈ Fq, the number of the inverse image of y is #ϕ−1~sM+1(y) = ql(k−d(C
⊥)+1)
.
So the information held by the colluders allows them to calculate ql equally likely different
labels for sM+1 and hence their probability of success is 1/ql which is equal to guess a label
b0,K+1+b1,K+1sM+1+b2,K+1sqM+1+ · · ·+bM,K+1s
qM−1
M+1 for sM+1 randomly from Fql . And hence
we finish the proof of the theorem.
Next, we prove our claim. As K + 1 = d(C⊥) − 1, g1, g2, · · · , gK+1 is linearly inde-
pendent over Fql , otherwise the dual code C⊥ will have a codeword with Hamming weight
6 d(C⊥) − 1 which is impossible by the definition of minimum distance of a code. Then
choose k − K − 1 = k − d(C⊥) + 1 extra columns of G such that they combining with
g1, g2, · · · , gK+1 form a basis of Fkql . Without loss of generality, we assume the first k
columns of G is linearly independent of Fql . For any P ∈ F(M+1)×(k−d(C
⊥ )+1)
ql , consider the
system of linear equations
(2.3)


H1S M
H2S M
...
HKS M

· A =

C1
...
CK
 ,
A ·

g1,1 g1,2 · · · g1,K
g2,1 g2,2 · · · g2,K
...
...
. . .
...
gk,1 gk,2 · · · gk,K

=

b0,1 b0,2 · · · b0,K
b1,1 b1,2 · · · b1,K
...
...
. . .
...
bM,1 bM,2 · · · bM,K

,
A ·

g1,K+2 g1,K+3 · · · g1,k
g2,K+2 g2,K+3 · · · g2,k
...
...
. . .
...
gk,K+2 gk,K+3 · · · gk,k

= P .
3This construction step is trivial.
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By Lemma 5, System (2.3) has ql solutions, saying A1, A2, · · · , Aql . And A1, A2, · · · , Aql
are also solutions of System (2.1). Next, we show{
ϕ~sM+1(A j) | j = 1, 2, · · · , ql
}
= Fql .
Otherwise, there are two solutions A j1 and A j2 such that
(1, ~sM+1, ~sqM+1, · · · , ~sq
M−1
M+1)A j1

g1,K+1
g2,K+1
...
gk,K+1

= (1, ~sM+1, ~sqM+1, · · · , ~sq
M−1
M+1)A j2

g1,K+1
g2,K+1
...
gk,K+1

.
Then we have

1 ~s1 ~sq1 · · · ~s
qM−1
1
1 ~s2 ~sq2 · · · ~s
qM−1
2
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 ~sM+1 ~sqM+1 · · · ~s
qM−1
M+1

A j1

g1,1 g1,2 · · · g1,k
g2,1 g2,2 · · · g2,k
...
...
. . .
...
gk,1 gk,2 · · · gk,k

=

1 ~s1 ~sq1 · · · ~s
qM−1
1
1 ~s2 ~sq2 · · · ~s
qM−1
2
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 ~sM+1 ~sqM+1 · · · ~s
qM−1
M+1

A j2

g1,1 g1,2 · · · g1,k
g2,1 g2,2 · · · g2,k
...
...
. . .
...
gk,1 gk,2 · · · gk,k

.
But the Moore matrix 
1 ~s1 ~sq1 · · · ~s
qM−1
1
1 ~s2 ~sq2 · · · ~s
qM−1
2
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 ~sM+1 ~sqM+1 · · · ~s
qM−1
M+1

is invertible since ~s1, ~s2, · · · , ~sM+1 ∈ Fql are linearly independent over Fq. And the matrix

g1,1 g1,2 · · · g1,k
g2,1 g2,2 · · · g2,k
...
...
. . .
...
gk,1 gk,2 · · · gk,k

is invertible by our assumption. So A j1 = A j2 which contradicts to the condition A j1 , A j2 .
And hence, the statement (1) holds.
Next, we prove (2). Any one solution of System (2.1) gives one P ∈ F(M+1)×(k−d(C⊥ )+1)ql ,
while corresponding to such a P there are ql solutions of System (2.1) from the proof of
(1). In this way, we partition solutions of System (2.1) into ql(k−d(C⊥)+1) parts such that each
part contains ql elements. Also from the proof of (1), the image of each part under ϕ~sM+1 is
Fql . So for any y ∈ Fql , the number of the inverse image of y is #ϕ−1~sM+1(y) = q
l(k−d(C⊥)+1)
. So
far, we have finished the proof of our claim.

Remark 3. From the proofs of Lemma 5 and Theorem 6, the coalition of malicious nodes
B can successfully make a substitution attack to the node Ri if and only if gi is contained
in the subspace of Fkql generated by {g j | j ∈ B}, where g j represents the j-th column of the
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generator matrix G. In this case, they can recover the private key of Ri using the linear-
ity relationship. So we connect our authentication scheme with the linear secret sharing
scheme in the way that we regard the private key of Ri as the secret key and the private keys
of other verifying nodes are shares of the private key of Ri. Then similarly as the linear se-
cret sharing scheme [4, 5] which considered the first component of codewords as the secret
key location, using the modified definition of the minimal codewords of a linear code given
in the introducion, we can characterize the malicious groups that can successfully make a
substitution attack to some other node completely. This is what Theorem 3 and Corollary 4
say about.
3. The Authentication Scheme Based on Algebraic Geometry Codes
In this section, we give examples of our authentication schemes based on some explicit
linear codes, AG codes from elliptic curves. First, recall the definition of AG codes.
We fix some notation valid for this entire section.
• X/Fq is a geometrically irreducible smooth projective curve of genus g over the
finite field Fq with function field Fq(X).
• X(Fq) is the set of all Fq-rational points on X.
• D = {R1,R2, · · · ,Rn} is a proper subset of rational points X(Fq).
• Without any confusion, also write D = R1 + R2 + · · · + Rn.
• G is a divisor of degree k (2g − 2 < k < n) with Supp(G) ∩ D = ∅.
Let V be a divisor on X. Denote by L (V) the Fq-vector space of all rational functions
f ∈ Fq(X) with the principal divisor div( f ) > −V , together with the zero function. And
Denote by Ω(V) the Fq-vector space of all Weil differentials ω with divisor div(ω) > V ,
together with the zero differential (cf. [26]).
Then the residue AG code CΩ(D,G) is defined to be the image of the following residue
map:
res : Ω(G − D) → Fnq; ω 7→ (resR1 (ω), resR2(ω), · · · , resRn (ω)) .
And its dual code, the functional AG code CL (D,G) is defined to be the image of the
following evaluation map:
ev : L (G) → Fnq; f 7→ ( f (R1), f (R2), · · · , f (Rn)) .
They have the code parameters [n, n−k+g−1, d > k−2g+2] and [n, k−g+1, d > n−k],
respectively. And we have the following isomorphism
CΩ(D,G)  CL (D, D − G + (η))
for some Weil differential η satisfying υPi (η) = −1 and ηPi(1) = 1 for all i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n
([26, Proposition 2.2.10]).
For the authentication scheme based on the simplest AG codes, i.e., generalized Reed-
Solomon codes, we have determined all the malicious groups that can make a substitution
attack to any (not necessarily all) other in Corollary 4. Next, we consider the authentica-
tion scheme based on AG codes CΩ(D,G) from elliptic curves. Using the Riemann-Roch
theorem, the malicious groups who together are able to make a substitution attack to any
(not necessarily all) other or not can be characterized completely as follows.
Theorem 7. Let X = E be an elliptic curve over Fq, D = {R1,R2, · · · ,Rn} a subset of E(Fq)
such that the zero element O < D and let G = kO (0 < k < n). Then for the authentication
scheme we constructed based on the AG code CΩ(D,G), we have
(i): Any coalition of up to (n− k− 2) malicious receivers can not make a substitution
attack to any other receiver.
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(ii): A malicious group A ⊆ D, #A = n − k − 1, can successfully make a substitution
attack to the receiver R j ∈ D \ A if and only if∑
P∈D\A
P = R j .
Moreover, we note that they can only successfully make a substitution attack to the
receiver
∑
P∈D\A P if
∑
P∈D\A P ∈ D \ A.
(iii): A malicious group A ⊆ D, #A = n − k, can successfully make a substitution
attack to the receiver R j ∈ D \ A if and only if there exists some Q ∈ E(Fq) \ {R j}
such that the sum
Q +
∑
P∈D\A
P = R j ,
which is equivalent to ∑
P∈D\A
P , O .
And hence, such a malicious group can successfully make a substitution attack to
any other receiver.
(iv): A malicious group with at least (n − k + 1) members can successfully make a
substitution attack to any other receiver.
Proof. The statement (i) follows from Theorem 6 as the minimum distance
d⊥(CΩ(D,G)) = d(CL (D,G)) ≥ n − k .
For the statement (ii), if the malicious group A ⊆ D, #A = n − k − 1, can successfully
make a substitution attack to the receiver R j ∈ D \ A, then there exists some non-zero
function in the dual code f ∈ L (kO −∑R∈D\A R + R j), i.e.,
div( f ) >
∑
R∈D\A
R − R j − kO .
Both sides of the above inequality have degree 0, so
div( f ) =
∑
R∈D\A
R − R j − kO .
That is, ∑
R∈D\A
R = R j .
Similarly for the statement (iii), if a malicious group A ⊆ D, #A = n−k, can successfully
make a substitution attack to the receiver R j ∈ D \ A, there exists some non-zero function
f ∈ L (kO −∑R∈D\A R + R j) \L (kO −∑R∈D\A R), i.e.,
f (R j) , 0 and div( f ) >
∑
R∈D\A
R − R j − kO .
Then there is an extra zero Q ∈ E(Fq) \ {R j} of f such that
div( f ) =
∑
R∈D\A
R − R j + Q − kO .
That is, ∑
R∈A
R + Q = R j .
The rest of (iii) is obvious.
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We prove the statement (iv) by contradiction. A malicious group A can not successfully
make a substitution attack to the receiver R j if and only if there exists a linear function
f ∈ L (D −G + (η))
such that
f (R j) = 1, and f (R) = 0 ∀R ∈ A .
As f ∈ L (D − G + (η)), f has at most deg(D − G + (η)) = n − k zeros. So if
#A ≥ n − k + 1 ,
the malicious group A can successfully make a substitution attack to any other receiver.

Finally, we give a remark on the above theorem to finish this section.
Remark 4. If for any A ⊆ D with #A = n − k, the inequality∑
P∈D\A
P , O .
holds, then the minimum distance [27, 28] of the AG code CΩ(D,G) is
d(CΩ(D,G)) = k + 1 .
In this case, CΩ(D,G) is MDS. So by the property of MDS codes, its dual code CL (D,G)
is also MDS, i.e.,
d(CL (D,G)) = n − k + 1 .
Also in this case, such a malicious group in Theorem 7(ii) does not exist. So it coincides
with Corollary 4.
On the other side, if CΩ(D,G) is not MDS, then there exists A ⊆ D with #A = n− k such
that ∑
P∈D\A
P = O .
Such a malicious group A can not successfully make a substitution attack to any other
receiver.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we construct an authentication scheme based on linear code C [V, k, d] for
subspace codes over network coding. It is an unconditional secure authentication scheme,
which can offer robustness against a coalition of up to (d(C⊥) − 2) malicious receivers.
If we take C to be Reed-Solomon codes, then our authentication scheme can be regarded
as a modification of the multi-receiver authentication scheme for multiple messages given
by Safavi-Naini and Wang [1]. The authentication scheme based on the Reed-Solomon
code [V, k, d] is a (V, k) threshold authentication scheme, any k − 1 of the V receivers can
not produce a fake message, with a higher probability than randomly guessing a label
for the message, that can be accepted by any other receiver, but any k of the V verifying
receivers can easily produce a fake message that can be accepted by any other receiver. To
generalize the scheme with Reed-Solomon codes to that with arbitrary linear codes, there
are several advantages similar as the advantages of generalizing Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme to linear secret sharing sceme [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. First, for a fixed message space
Gq(l, n), by choosing proper linear codes, our scheme allows arbitrarily many receivers to
check the integrity of their own messages. while the scheme with Reed-Solomon codes
has a constraint on the number of verifying receivers V 6 ql. Secondly, for some important
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receiver, coalitions of k or more malicious receivers can not yet make a substitution attack
on the receiver more efficiently than randomly guessing a label from the finite field for a
fake message.
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